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Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 19 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest incidents in the ongoing Palestinian campaign of terrorism directed against Israel.

This past Saturday evening, 16 February, at approximately 7.45 p.m. (local time), a suicide bomber blew himself up next to a pizza shop in a shopping mall in the community of Karnei Shomron. The attack occurred at an hour when the shopping area was filled with people and claimed the lives of two Israeli youths — Nehemia Amar and Keren Satsky, both aged 15. Twenty-nine others were injured in the blast, several of them seriously. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility.

Yesterday evening, within the space of two hours, four Israelis were killed in two separate attacks. The first occurred near the entrance to the community of Gush Katif when Palestinian terrorists ambushed two Israeli vehicles, killing an Israeli woman, Ahuva Amergi, and seriously wounding another. As Israeli forces arrived on the scene, a gun battle ensued in which two Israeli soldiers were killed. The Al-Aksa Brigades, of Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat's own Fatah faction, claimed responsibility for the attack.

The second attack occurred about two hours earlier on the outskirts of Jerusalem when policemen at a roadblock stopped a suspicious vehicle for inspection. Terrorists then detonated a powerful car bomb, killing Ahmed Mazarib, age 32, an Israeli policeman. The Al-Aksa Brigades claimed responsibility for this attack as well.

These attacks are the latest in the continuing campaign of Palestinian terrorism that has been detailed in my letters dated 28 January 2002 (A/56/798-S/2002/126), 22 January 2002 (A/56/788-S/2002/104), 18 January 2002 (A/56/781-S/2002/86), 16 January 2002 (A/56/774-S/2002/73), 11 January 2002 (A/56/771-S/2002/47), 4 January 2002 (A/56/766-S/2002/25), 13 December 2001 (A/56/706-S/2001/1198), 4 December 2001 (A/56/678-S/2001/1150), 30 November 2001 (A/56/670-

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S/2001/1141), 27 November 2001 (A/56/663-S/2001/1121), 12 November 2001 (A/56/617-S/2001/1071), 5 November 2001 (A/56/604-S/2001/1048), 24 October 2001 (A/56/506-S/2001/1011), 19 October 2001 (A/56/492-S/2001/990), 17 October 2001 (A/56/483-S/2001/975), 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17 September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108), and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The State of Israel hold the Palestinian Authority directly responsible for these attacks due to the fact that forces under its control are largely to blame for the growing terrorist threat facing Israeli civilians. Both of yesterday's attacks were perpetrated by terrorists under the direct authority of Chairman Arafat and belonging to his governing Fatah faction. The Palestinian leadership has also encouraged other groups to increase the level of attacks against Israel by releasing key members from prison, cooperating with them in planning and carrying out attacks, and continuing to incite the population to violence through official Palestinian media outlets.

Throughout, Chairman Arafat has persisted in his efforts to deceive the world by claiming to be working towards a ceasefire. The seizure of 50 tons of sophisticated weapons aboard the Karine A several weeks ago, in addition to the central role played by Chairman Arafat's forces in executing attacks against Israeli civilians, undermines the legitimacy of any such claims by the Palestinian leadership. As the Palestinian campaign of terrorism enters its seventeenth month, and even as the international community has proclaimed its absolute intolerance for acts of terrorism against civilians and demanded that Chairman Arafat take more concerted action to fight terrorism, it is disheartening to see that the Palestinian leadership has still failed to abandon the path of violence.

With his continuing support for violence against Israelis, Chairman Arafat has blatantly violated his historic commitment, enshrined in his letter of 9 September 1993 to the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, to renounce the use of violence and terrorism and to resolve all outstanding issues through peaceful bilateral negotiations. He persists in inciting his people to violence with calls for holy war and for martyrs to sacrifice themselves on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Adoring portraits of suicide bombers continue to adorn the walls of Palestinian Authority schools and other public buildings.

Such behaviour is a prescription for ongoing bloodshed and will not yield the results that both Israel and the Palestinian people desire. The international community must continue to make clear to the Palestinian leadership its unequivocal rejection of violence for political ends and continue to exert full pressure until the Palestinian leadership ends its support for terrorism, uproots the infrastructure of terror that exists in its territory, arrests known terrorists currently operating with impunity, and returns in earnest to a process of dialogue and negotiations.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aaron **Jacob**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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General Assembly
Security Council

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15 February 2002

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 15 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, continues with its bloody military campaign against the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, committing still more war crimes and State terrorism. In the early morning hours of today, 15 February 2002 (Palestine time), Israeli occupying forces used tanks, armoured personnel carriers and bulldozers to enter several Palestinian towns, destroying a Palestinian home and destroying Palestinian farmland. Moreover, in Saida, a Palestinian town to the north-east of Tulkarem in the West Bank, Israeli occupying forces committed yet another extrajudicial execution, killing Mr. Anwar Awni Abdel Ghani. Also today, Israeli F-16 warplanes attacked a Palestinian security compound in the Jabilaya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip, killing one Palestinian officer and injuring many other Palestinians, some of them critically.

All of the above-mentioned Israeli war crimes and acts of State terrorism affirm yet again that Mr. Ariel Sharon and his Government want only to pursue the path of military confrontation, escalating the violence and compounding the human losses and physical destruction. We reiterate that the international community must stand up to such Israeli policies and practices and must take measures to bring an end to Israeli war crimes, State terrorism and other atrocities committed against the Palestinian people.

In follow-up to my previous 96 letters to you regarding the bloody Israeli military campaign in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 13 February 2002 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116;

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A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941; A/ES-10/117-S/2001/971; A/ES-10/118-S/2001/989; A/ES-10/119-S/2001/991; A/ES-10/121-S/2001/1007; A/ES-10/122-S/2001/1024; A/ES-10/123-S/2001/1036; A/ES-10/124-S/2001/1084; A/ES-10/125-S/2001/1092; A/ES-10/126-S/2001/1118; A/ES-10/128-S/2001/1149; A/ES-10/129-S/2001/1166; A/ES-10/133-S/2000/1239; A/ES-10/134-S/2001/126; A/ES-10/136-S/2002/18; A/ES-10/137-S/2002/39; A/ES-10/138-S/2002/48; A/ES-10/139-S/2002/58; A/ES-10/140-S/2002/89; A/ES-10/141-S/2002/95; A/ES-10/142-S/2002/102; A/ES-10/143-S/2002/121; A/ES-10/144-S/2002/142; A/ES-10/145-S/2002/146; and A/ES-10/146-S/2002/165), I regret to inform you that the above-mentioned killings raise the total number of Palestinians killed since 28 September 2000 to 887. (The names of the martyrs are contained in the annex to the present letter.)

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter and its annex distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Marwan **Jilani**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex to the identical letters dated 15 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Names of martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem[a]

(Friday, 15 February 2002)

1. Anwar Awni Abdel Ghani
2. Abdel Salam Yunis

[a] The total number of Palestinian martyrs killed by Israeli occupying forces since 28 September 2000 is 887.

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Security Council

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Letter dated 12 February 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 16 November 2001 (S/2001/1097), I informed the members of the Council that, given the important and essential role of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, it was my intention to continue its activities for the biennium 2002-2003 at the current resource level, pending an improvement in the security situation that would allow me to submit a proposal for the establishment of a peace-building office in Somalia.

I have the honour to inform the members of the Security Council of my intention to appoint Winston A. Tubman as my Representative in Somalia and Head of the Office. He will succeed David Stephen, who did excellent work in Somalia before taking up his new assignment in Guinea-Bissau recently.

I should be grateful if you could bring the present letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

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Letter dated 19 February 2002 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 12 February 2002 (S/2002/176) concerning your intention to appoint Winston A. Tubman as your Representative in Somalia and Head of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intention contained in your letter.

(*Signed*) Adolfo **Aguilar Zínser**
President of the Security Council

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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1380 (2001) of 27 November 2001, by which the Council, taking note of my letter to the President of the Security Council dated 12 November 2001 (S/2001/1067), extended the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 28 February 2002. The Council also reaffirmed its resolution 1359 (2001) of 29 June 2001 and its previous resolutions on the question of Western Sahara, and requested me to keep the Council informed of all significant developments in an interim report by 15 January. The Council requested me to provide an assessment of the situation and, as appropriate, recommendations on the future mandate and composition of the mission. The present report covers developments since my interim report to the Council, dated 10 January 2002 (S/2002/41).

II. Activities of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General

2. On 24 and 25 January 2002, my Personal Envoy, James A. Baker III, visited Morocco, where he was received twice by His Majesty King Mohammed VI and high-level government officials. The purpose of the visit of my Personal Envoy was to inform the Moroccan authorities of the rejection by Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO of the draft framework agreement, as had been reiterated to him by the President of Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, during his visit to the James Baker Institute in Houston, Texas, on 2 November 2001, and that, in the view of my Personal Envoy, Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO would be prepared to discuss or negotiate a division of the Territory as a political solution to the dispute over Western Sahara.

3. During his visit to the region, my Personal Envoy took the opportunity to pay a short visit to the MINURSO headquarters in Laayoune, where he met with my recently appointed Special Representative, William Lacy Swing.

III. Developments on the ground

A. Activities of my Special Representative

4. Following his introductory meetings with Moroccan Government authorities at Rabat and the Frente POLISARIO leadership in the Tindouf area, my Special Representative also made his introductory visit to Algiers from 14 to 17 January, where he met with President Bouteflika and senior members of the Government of Algeria. While in Algiers, he also met with officials from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP), who are implementing humanitarian assistance programmes in the Tindouf refugee camps. On 27 January, he met in Casablanca with a delegation of senior UNHCR officials to discuss cross-border confidence-building measures.

5. Subsequently, on 17 January, my Special Representative visited the Tindouf area where he met with the Secretary-General of the Frente POLISARIO, Mohamed Abdelaziz, and other members of the Frente POLISARIO leadership. He had several meetings in

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Laayoune with the Moroccan Coordinator with MINURSO. These contacts are part of my Special Representative's effort to maintain a pattern of regular contacts with the parties.

6. On 13 and 14 February, my Special Representative made his introductory visit to Nouakchott, where he met with the President of Mauritania, Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya, and other senior government officials, as well as the UNHCR representative in Mauritania.

B. Appeals process

7. Since my last report to the Council (S/2002/41), the Identification Commission has reduced its staff to a total of 40. It has continued to consolidate and collate all data on applicants to the referendum, collected during their identification and the submission of appeals. The Commission proceeded with the electronic archiving of individual files. As at 31 January 2002, the total number of files electronically archived in both the Territory and the Tindouf area exceeded 43,000. The Commission has also initiated a technical review of the logistical requirements in the event of a resumption of the appeals process.

C. Military aspects

8. As at 7 February 2002, the military component of MINURSO stood at the authorized strength of 230 military personnel (see annex). Under the command of Brigadier General Claude Buze (Belgium), the component continued to monitor the ceasefire between the Royal Moroccan Army and the Frente POLISARIO military forces, which has been in effect since 6 September 1991. It is important to reiterate that since the entry into effect of the ceasefire, and the establishment of MINURSO, there has been no resumption of hostilities between the parties, and no indication on the ground that either side intends to resume them in the near future. The contribution of MINURSO to the maintenance of the ceasefire has been significant.

9. During the reporting period, MINURSO continued discussions with the Frente POLISARIO, at various levels, with a view to easing or lifting the restrictions which have been imposed by the latter on the freedom of movement of United Nations military observers east of the defensive sandwall (berm) since January 2001. As already reported to the Security Council (see S/2001/148, S/2001/398, S/2001/613 and S/2002/41), MINURSO ground patrols are usually not allowed closer than 800 metres to Frente POLISARIO combat units or observation posts, and are required to be escorted at all times by Frente POLISARIO liaison officers, who exercise de facto control of the patrols' movements. Large tracts of land south and east of the MINURSO team site at Agwanit are still out of bounds for the United Nations. MINURSO air reconnaissance remains limited to the 30-kilometre restricted area immediately east of the berm and has to follow air routes approved by the Frente POLISARIO. Despite the efforts of MINURSO, no significant progress can be reported towards lifting those restrictions. I call on the Security Council to join me in requesting the Frente POLISARIO to lift the restrictions without delay.

10. On the western side of the berm, MINURSO military patrols continued to visit and inspect Royal Moroccan Army ground units larger than company size, in accordance with the ceasefire arrangements between MINURSO and the Royal Moroccan Army.

11. As the Council will recall, in April and May 2001, Moroccan military authorities had begun preparations for the construction of an asphalted road in the Guerguerat area of Western Sahara, at the south-western tip of the Territory, towards the Mauritanian border. Morocco subsequently suspended this activity at the request of several Member States and MINURSO. MINURSO has since conducted regular air and ground reconnaissance in the area (the last air reconnaissance was performed on 26 January 2002 and the last ground reconnaissance on 1 February 2002), but has found no signs of further roadwork being conducted in the area.

D. Civilian police aspects

12. As at 7 February 2002, the strength of the civilian police component of MINURSO stood at 25 officers (see annex), under the command of Inspector General Om Prakash Rathor (India). The civilian police officers continued to perform protective duties with regard to files and sensitive materials at the Identification Commission centres at Laayoune and Tindouf. Training activities, such as briefings by the UNHCR liaison office in Laayoune, continued on the protection content of voluntary repatriation and on international instruments concerning refugees.

E. Preparatory work for the repatriation of the Saharan refugees

13. During the reporting period, UNHCR continued to carry out its mandated responsibilities for the Western Saharan refugees in the Tindouf camps and to coordinate with MINURSO. A senior UNHCR delegation visited the region from 26 January to 2 February 2002 to discuss, after consulting with MINURSO, with Morocco, the Frente POLISARIO, and Algeria, the issue of cross-border confidence-building measures for Saharan refugees. The Government of Morocco assured the UNHCR delegation that it was in principle prepared to accept the proposals made by UNHCR, provided that the implementation modalities were agreed upon at a later stage. The Frente POLISARIO reiterated its position that the implementation of these activities should be carried out only within the context of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr. 1). The Government of Algeria, while reiterating its support of the settlement plan, reaffirmed its full cooperation with UNHCR, in particular for the planned implementation of cross-border confidence-building measures, provided that the refugees agreed to it.

14. On 26 January 2002, UNHCR held consultations with the Government of Algerian, WFP, the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), and its implementing partners to address issues of mutual concern regarding the implementation of its programme in 2002. Owing to financial constraints, the frequent shortages in basic food commodities for Saharan refugees continued to be a major concern for UNHCR. To address this issue, at a meeting it organized together with WFP in Algiers on 29 January 2002, UNHCR launched an appeal for funds sufficient to cover an expected three-month gap in food supplies, pending WFP food shipments. A joint WFP-UNHCR food assessment mission, accompanied by representatives of the host Government and donor countries, visited the Tindouf camps from 1 to 7 February 2002. From 22 to 26 January 2002, UNHCR had conducted another fact-finding mission to monitor the Saharan refugee situation in northern Mauritania.

15. The food shortages faced by Saharan refugees in the Tindouf camps is also a matter of great concern. I once again appeal to the international community to provide generous support to UNHCR and WFP in order to help them overcome the deteriorating food situation among the refugees. I also strongly appeal to Morocco and the Frente POLISARIO to agree without further delay to fully collaborate with UNHCR in the implementation of the long-overdue confidence-building measures, as initially called for by the Security Council in its resolution 1238 (1999) and then in subsequent resolutions.

F. Prisoners of war, persons unaccounted for and detainees

16. As the Council will recall, on 2 January the Frente POLISARIO announced the release of 115 of the 1,477 Moroccan prisoners of war it was holding. Those prisoners of war were repatriated under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on 17 January. This action, together with the effort by Morocco to account for some former Frente POLISARIO combatants unaccounted for and the amnesty it granted in November 2001 to 25 Saharan detainees, are steps in the right direction. If continued and accelerated, these gestures will help to bring the parties closer to finally resolving these matters of urgent humanitarian concern.

17. In the meantime, I have asked my Special Representative to maintain regular and close contact with all the parties and to continue to provide assistance to ICRC and UNHCR in the performance of their vital humanitarian tasks. In this regard, I wish to remind the Council that, to date, some 1,362 Moroccan prisoners of war remain held in connection with the Western Sahara conflict, most of them for more than 20 years. More than 10 years after the entry into effect of the ceasefire, their release is long overdue, both under international humanitarian law and commitments that the parties undertook in this regard. It is my hope that members of the Council will once again join me in calling on the Frente POLISARIO to release without further delay all remaining prisoners of war. It is also my hope that both parties will continue to cooperate with the efforts of ICRC to resolve the problem of the fate of all those unaccounted for since the beginning of the conflict.

G. Organization of African Unity

18. The observer delegation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to MINURSO, led by the senior

representative of the Organization, Ambassador Yilma Tadesse (Ethiopia), continues to provide valuable support and cooperation to the Mission. I wish to reiterate my sincere appreciation for this contribution.

IV. Other developments

19. On 29 January 2002, the Legal Counsel responded to a letter addressed to him on 13 November 2001 by the President of the Security Council requesting, on behalf of the members of the Council, his opinion on the legality of contracts off-shore Western Sahara concluded by Morocco with foreign oil companies (S/2002/161). In a letter addressed to me, dated 1 February 2002, the Permanent Representative of Algeria expressed his views on this issue (S/2002/144). The representative of the Frente POLISARIO in New York addressed two letters on the same subject to the President of the Security Council on 7 and 18 February, and the Permanent Representative of Morocco expressed his views in his letter of 8 February addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2002/153).

20. On 24 December 2001, Saharan detainees started a three-week-long hunger strike in the Laayoune prison. Following a series of measures taken by Moroccan authorities to reduce prison overcrowding, including the transfer of detainees to other penitentiaries, the hunger strike subsided. Some Saharan detainees resumed their hunger strike on 24 January, but suspended it again within two days.

V. Financial aspects

21. The General Assembly, by its resolution 55/262 of 14 June 2001, appropriated the amount of $48.8 million, equivalent to a monthly rate of some $4.1 million, for the maintenance of MINURSO for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002. In connection with the reduction of personnel in the Identification Commission, as well as other related cost reductions, I shall continue to reassess the resource requirements of the Mission and revert to the General Assembly with consequential adjustments, if necessary.

22. As at 31 January 2002, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for MINURSO amounted to $60,973,553. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations at that date amounted to $2,165,678,953.

VI. Assessment of progress and problems since the appointment of my Personal Envoy

23. In my report of 20 June 2001 to the Security Council (S/2001/613), I described in some detail the difficulties that the United Nations had encountered over the past 10 years in its effort to implement the settlement plan, which has resulted in repeated breakdowns in the identification process. After a particularly long impasse in the process, which had lasted from the end of 1995 to the beginning of 1997, upon assuming my functions as Secretary-General I appointed James A. Baker III as my Personal Envoy in March 1997, and asked him to reassess the feasibility of implementing the settlement plan. After a tour of the region, during which he met with the leadership of the two parties and the neighbouring countries, Mr. Baker informed me that, despite the difficulties and delays in the process, neither side had indicated any willingness to pursue any political solution other than the implementation of the settlement plan.

24. My Personal Envoy believed that the only realistic way to assess the feasibility of implementing the plan would be by arranging direct talks between the parties. He was, however, aware that previous efforts by the United Nations over the years to organize such direct talks had not succeeded, mainly because of the reluctance of the Government of Moroccan to meet face-to-face with the Frente POLISARIO.

25. When the parties met directly in Lisbon on 23 June 1997, it was the first time in many years that they did so to discuss matters of substance. That meeting lasted only one day as it became apparent that both sides had problems accepting the proposal submitted by my Personal Envoy to bridge their differences on resuming the identification process and both needed to consult with their principals before responding. This was a pattern that was to be repeated during the three other successive rounds of direct talks in 1997. None of the rounds lasted longer than a day and a half, as the parties exhibited great reluctance to agree to the bridging proposals aimed at resolving their differences on the issues separating them and hindering the implementation of the settlement plan. They needed to

break away and meet their principals before returning to the next round with requests for modifications to the proposals. Nevertheless, through the hard work and perseverance of my Personal Envoy and his team, agreement was reached on all issues separating the parties, and during the last round, held at Houston, Texas, from 14 to 16 September 1997, the Houston agreements, allowing for the resumption of the identification process and therefore the implementation of the settlement plan, came into effect.

26. Paragraphs 27 to 29 of my June 2001 report (S/2001/613) describe the difficulties encountered in carrying out and concluding the identification process and enumerate the remaining key unresolved issues of the settlement plan, even after the conclusion of the Houston agreements. As the report points out, since the conclusion of the identification process at the end of 1999, MINURSO has been facing a total of 131,038 appeals, with an appeals process that promises to be even lengthier and more cumbersome and contentious than the identification itself.

27. In view of these developments, early in 2000 I asked my Personal Envoy to undertake new consultations with the parties and neighbouring countries. After a visit to the region from 8 to 11 April, when he undertook preliminary contacts with all concerned, my Personal Envoy informed me that he needed to organize another face-to-face meeting between the parties in order to consider the problems in the implementation of the settlement plan (S/21360 and S/22464 and Corr.1) and the Houston agreements (S/1997/742, annexes I-III), as well as to explore other possible approaches.

28. The first of three such meetings in 2000 was held in London on 14 May. The neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, also attended. The meeting proved to be inconclusive in resolving the problems separating the parties. At the end, my Personal Envoy invited the parties to come forward at the next meeting with concrete solutions to the multiple problems of the settlement plan that they could both agree to, or else, be prepared to discuss other ways to achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara.

29. During the second meeting, held in London on 28 June 2000, each party identified areas, mainly concerning the appeals process and the repatriation of refugees, that in its view presented difficulties with respect to the implementation of the plan. However, neither party offered specific proposals to resolve the multiple problems of the settlement plan that both parties could agree to. In addition, my Personal Envoy indicated that, in his view, other issues remained unresolved, such as enforcement of the results of the referendum, release of prisoners of war and Saharan political detainees and possible problems relating to the implementation of the code of conduct for the referendum campaign.

30. In addition, my Personal Envoy expressed concern that the parties had so far failed to negotiate these problems because of the high level of animosity existing between them. In his view, neither party had shown any disposition to depart from the "winner-take-all" mentality or appeared willing to discuss any possible political solutions in which each could get some, but not all, of what it wanted and would allow the other side to do the same. After asking the parties again for concrete proposals to bridge their differences and receiving none, my Personal Envoy expressed the view that the meeting, instead of resolving problems, had in fact moved things backwards, as it had deepened the differences between the parties.

31. Nevertheless, he considered that a political solution was achievable only through direct dialogue between the parties, and asked them to meet again in order to try to arrive at a political solution. It was repeated to the parties that, should they agree to discuss a political solution other than the settlement plan, they would not prejudice their final positions since, according to the rules of the consultations, nothing would be agreed to until everything had been agreed to.

32. The third meeting between the parties under the auspices of my Personal Envoy was held in Berlin on 28 September 2000. During a discussion on the status of the settlement plan, the two parties reiterated their differing positions; both, however, pledged their cooperation with the United Nations. My Personal Envoy pointed out to the parties that he had been hearing the same arguments and pledges of cooperation since 1997 and expressed scepticism about the validity of such pledges.

33. He recalled that, at the start of the meeting, he had asked the parties whether they had come with new positions on any issue. He felt that there was no political will on either side to move forward. He

reiterated that there were many ways to achieve self-determination. It could be achieved through war or revolution; it could be achieved through elections, but this required good will; or it could be achieved through agreement, as had been done by parties to other disputes. When asked by my Personal Envoy whether they would be willing to try the latter route without abandoning the settlement plan, both parties reiterated their commitment to the plan. They expressed fundamental differences and perceptions as to its correct implementation, however.

34. My Personal Envoy then suggested that the parties explore ways to move the appeals process forward, as the Frente POLISARIO wished, and at the same time search for a mutually acceptable political solution, as the Security Council had requested in resolution 1309 (2000). The Moroccan delegation pointed out that the question of appeals had been extensively covered and was exhausted. In Morocco's view, that issue was deadlocked, not on technicalities, but on principles.

35. My Personal Envoy then asked the parties whether, without abandoning the settlement plan, they would be willing to pursue a political solution that might or might not be confirmed by a later referendum. The Frente POLISARIO responded that it was not ready to discuss anything outside the settlement plan. For its part, the Moroccan delegation stated that it was prepared to initiate a sincere and frank dialogue with the Frente POLISARIO, with the assistance of my Personal Envoy, to work out a lasting and definitive solution that would take account of Morocco's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the specifics of the region, in compliance with the democratic and decentralization principles that Morocco wished to develop and apply, beginning with the Saharan region.

36. The Frente POLISARIO rejected the Moroccan proposal and reiterated that it would cooperate and adhere to any dialogue that would be within the framework of the settlement plan.

37. At the conclusion of those consultations, my Personal Envoy was of the view, which I shared, that further meetings of the parties to seek a political solution could not succeed, and indeed could be counterproductive, unless the Government of Morocco as administrative power in Western Sahara was prepared to offer or support some devolution of governmental authority, for all inhabitants and former inhabitants of the Territory, that would be genuine, substantial and in keeping with international norms.

38. It was almost six months later, during the spring of 2001, that my Personal Envoy was able to determine that Morocco as administrative power in Western Sahara was prepared to support a draft framework agreement (S/2001/613, annex I) on the status of Western Sahara which envisaged a devolution of authority to the inhabitants of the Territory with final status to be determined by a referendum five years later. Once he ascertained the willingness of the Government of Morocco to support the draft framework agreement, my Personal Envoy presented it to the Government of Algeria and to the Frente POLISARIO. The Security Council had an opportunity to see for itself the views of the Government of Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO, which were annexed to my report (S/2001/613, annexes II and IV).

39. In view of the strong reservations expressed by the Government of Algeria and the unwillingness of the Frente POLISARIO to consider the draft framework agreement, the Security Council in its resolution 1359 (2001) supported my proposal to invite all the parties to meet directly or through proximity talks under the auspices of my Personal Envoy to discuss the framework agreement and to negotiate any specific changes that they would like to see in it. The Council also encouraged the parties to discuss any other proposal for a political solution, which might be put forward by the parties, to arrive at a mutually acceptable agreement. The Council affirmed in its resolution that while those discussions would go on, the proposals submitted by the Frente POLISARIO to overcome the obstacles preventing implementation of the settlement plan would be considered.

40. Following the adoption of resolution 1359 (2001), my Personal Envoy met with high-level representatives of the Frente POLISARIO and the Governments of Algeria and Mauritania at Pinedale, Wyoming, in August 2001. Neither the Government of Algeria nor the Frente POLISARIO was willing to engage in a detailed discussion of the draft framework agreement, notwithstanding indications of flexibility by the Government of Morocco conveyed to them by my Personal Envoy. In view of the responses that my Personal Envoy has received from the Government of Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO, which rejected the draft framework agreement (S/2002/41, annexes I and II), he does not see any real chance that the parties will

ultimately voluntarily agree to this approach to solve their dispute over Western Sahara. He is also of the view, which I share, that the proposal submitted by Algeria in lieu of the draft framework agreement, by which the United Nations would assume sovereignty over Western Sahara in order to implement provisions that appear identical to those of the settlement plan, has no more chance than the settlement plan of bringing about an early, durable and agreed resolution of the conflict over Western Sahara.

41. Thereafter, as indicated in paragraph 2 above, my Personal Envoy met with President Bouteflika and high-level officials of the Government of Algeria on 2 November 2001 at the James Baker Institute in Houston, Texas, and then twice with King Mohammed VI and high-level officials of the Government of Morocco in Morocco on 24 and 25 January 2002.

42. At my request, my Personal Envoy agreed almost five years ago to try to assist in finding a solution to the dispute over Western Sahara. As this and my prior reports to the Security Council demonstrate, he has worked tirelessly during that period. He has recently reaffirmed to me his disappointment at the lack of progress towards finding a solution to the problem of Western Sahara — a solution which is sorely needed for long-term peace, stability and prosperity in the Maghreb region.

VII. Observations and recommendations

43. Despite their assertions to the contrary, the parties have not been willing to fully cooperate with the United Nations either to implement the settlement plan or to try to negotiate a political solution that will bring about an early, durable and agreed resolution of their dispute over Western Sahara.

44. As indicated in my report of June 2001 (S/2001/613, para. 52), my Personal Envoy is of the view, on the basis of the assessment of the United Nations work over the past 10 years in trying to implement the settlement plan, including the almost five years during which he has been involved, that it is highly unlikely that the settlement plan can be implemented in its present form in a way that it will achieve an early, durable and agreed resolution of the dispute over Western Sahara.

45. My Personal Envoy is of the view that, notwithstanding indications from Morocco of a willingness to negotiate, it is pointless to pursue at this time, except as provided in paragraph 49 below, any more discussion on the draft framework agreement, as neither the Government of Algeria nor the Frente POLISARIO is willing to engage in discussing it.

46. My Personal Envoy is also of the view that, notwithstanding indications from Algeria and the Frente POLISARIO of a willingness to negotiate a possible division of the Territory, it is pointless to pursue at this time any such discussions, except in the manner provided in paragraph 50 below, as the Government of Morocco is unwilling to discuss such an approach, even though it reached a similar agreement with the Government of Mauritania in 1976. I concur with the views of my Personal Envoy as expressed in paragraphs 44, 45 and the present paragraph.

47. We are currently faced with a rather bleak situation with regard to the future of the peace process in Western Sahara. My Personal Envoy and I believe there are four options for consideration by the Security Council in the light of the above pessimistic but realistic assessment.

48. As a first option, the United Nations could, once again, resume trying to implement the settlement plan, but without requiring the concurrence of both parties before action could be taken. This effort would begin with the appeals process but, even under this non-consensual approach, the United Nations would in the years ahead face most of the problems and obstacles that it has faced during the past 10 years. Morocco has expressed unwillingness to go forward with the settlement plan; the United Nations might not be able to hold a free and fair referendum whose results would be accepted by both sides; and there would still be no mechanism to enforce the results of the referendum. Under this option, the Identification Commission of MINURSO would be reinforced and indeed the overall size of the operation would be increased.

49. As a second option, my Personal Envoy could undertake to revise the draft framework agreement, taking into account the concerns expressed by the parties and others with experience in such documents. However, in this event, my Personal Envoy would not seek the concurrence of the parties as has been done in the past with respect to the settlement plan and the

draft framework agreement. The revised framework agreement would be submitted to the Security Council, and the Council would then present it to the parties on a non-negotiable basis. Should the Security Council agree to this option, MINURSO could be downsized further.

50. As a third option, the Security Council could ask my Personal Envoy to explore with the parties one final time whether or not they would now be willing to discuss, under his auspices, directly or through proximity talks, a possible division of the Territory, with the understanding that nothing would be decided until everything was decided. Were the Security Council to choose this option, in the event that the parties would be unwilling or unable to agree upon a division of the Territory by 1 November 2002, my Personal Envoy would also be asked to thereafter show to the parties a proposal for division of the Territory that would also be presented to the Security Council. The Council would present this proposal to the parties on a non-negotiable basis. This approach to a political solution would give each party some, but not all, of what it wants and would follow the precedent, but not necessarily the same territorial arrangements, of the division agreed to in 1976 between Morocco and Mauritania. Were the Security Council to choose this option, MINURSO could be maintained at its present size, or it could be reduced even more.

51. As a fourth option, the Security Council could decide to terminate MINURSO, thereby recognizing and acknowledging that after more than 11 years and the expenditure of sums of money nearing half a billion dollars, the United Nations is not going to solve the problem of Western Sahara without requiring that one or the other or both of the parties do something that they do not wish to voluntarily agree to do.

52. I am aware that none of the above-mentioned options will appear ideal to all the parties and interested countries. In order to give the Security Council time to decide, I recommend that the mandate of MINURSO be extended for two months, until 30 April 2002.

Annex

United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara: contributions as at 7 February 2002

	Military observers	*Force commander*	*Troops*	*Civilian police**	*Total*
Argentina	1				1
Austria	3				3
Bangladesh	9				9
Belgium		1			1
China	16				16
Egypt	19				19
El Salvador	4				4
France	25				25
Ghana	8		7	3	18
Greece	1				1
Guinea	3				3
Honduras	12				12
Hungary	6				6
Ireland	3				3
India				2	2
Italy	5				5
Jordan				5	5
Kenya	9				9
Malaysia	13				13
Nigeria	6			3	9
Norway				2	2
Pakistan	6			2	8
Poland	5				5
Portugal	4			4	8
Republic of Korea			20		20
Russian Federation	25				25
Senegal				3	3
Sweden				1	1
Uruguay	13				13
United States of America	7				7
Total	**203**	**1**	**27**	**25**	**256**

* Authorized strength is 81.



Map No. 3691 Rev. 36 UNITED NATIONS
February 2002

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Cartographic Section

United Nations S/2002/179

Security Council

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20 February 2002
English
Original: Arabic

Letter dated 19 February 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you the text of the section of the Final Communiqué adopted at the twenty-second session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council, held in Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, on 30 and 31 December 2001, under the chairmanship of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman, relating to the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.

I request that this letter and its annex be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdulaziz bin Nasser **Al-Shamsi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

02-25839 (E) 210202 210202

Annex to the letter dated 19 February 2002 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Text of the section of the Final Communiqué adopted at the twenty-second session of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council relating to the occupation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa

The Supreme Council discussed the issue of the occupation by Iran of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, recalling and reaffirming the decisions it had taken at its twenty-first session.

Having considered the recent contacts between the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Supreme Council affirmed the full sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and over their territorial waters, their airspace and the related continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, as integral parts of the country.

In accordance with the principle of the collective security of the GCC countries, the Council voiced its support for all the steps being taken by the United Arab Emirates to restore its sovereignty over all three islands by peaceful means. It affirmed its unconditional rejection of all the claims made and measures taken by Iran with respect to the three islands on the grounds that they are null and void, have no legal effect and do not derogate from the established rights of the United Arab Emirates with regard to its three islands.

The Council renewed its call to the Islamic Republic of Iran to agree to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice.

Following a comprehensive assessment, the Supreme Council instructed the Ministerial Council to continue to examine all peaceful measures that might be conducive to the restoration of the legitimate rights of the United Arab Emirates with respect to its three islands.

United Nations S/2002/180

Security Council

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20 February 2002

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Note verbale dated 19 February 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malawi to the United Nations, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Group at the United Nations, has the honour to submit a text of the communiqué of the Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community, which was held in Blantyre, Malawi, on Monday, 14 January 2002.

The Permanent Representative of the Republic of Malawi wishes to request the esteemed President of the Council to consider classifying the SADC communiqué as an official document of the Security Council.

02-25845 (E) 210202

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Annex to the note verbale dated 19 February 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Malawi to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

JANUARY 2002 SADC EXTRA-ORDINARY SUMMIT OF HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT

The Extra-Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), met in Blantyre, Malawi on 14 January 2002, and was chaired by His Excellency, Dr. Bakili Muluzi, President of the Republic of Malawi.

1. The Heads of State and Government of SADC present at the Summit were:

Angola	H.E President Mr Jose Eduardo Dos Santos
Botswana	H.E. President Mr Festus G. Mogae
Democratic Republic of Congo	H.E. President Mr Joseph Kabila
Lesotho	Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Prof. Pakalitha Mosisili
Malawi	H.E. President Dr Bakili Muluzi
Mozambique	H.E. President Mr Joaquim Chissano
Namibia	Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Mr Hage Geingob
South Africa	H.E President Mr Thabo Mbeki
Swaziland	Rt. Hon. Prime Minister Dr Sibusiso Diamini

Tanzania	H.E. President Mr Benjamin William Mkapa
Zambia	H.E. President Mr Levy Patrick Mwanawasa
Zimbabwe	H.E. President Mr Robert G. Mugabe

2. The Heads of State and Government of the following countries were represented by:

Mauritius	Honourable Mr Anil Kumarsighn Gayan Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation
Seychelles	His Excellency Mr Peter Sinon High Commisioner of the Republic of Seychelles to South Africa

3. Also in attendance were the President of the Republic of Uganda, His Excellency Mr Yoweri Museveni, and Honourable Mr Andre Bumaya the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Rwanda. The Organisation of African Unity was represented by Ambassador Said Djinnit, Assistant Secretary General in charge of Political Affairs. The Summit was also attended by the Former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, Facilitator of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue

4. In his address to the opening session of the Summit, the SADC Chairperson, H.E. Dr Bakili Muluzi, President of the Republic of Malawi, welcomed the Heads of State and Government to Malawi, and expressed a desire for sustainable peace, security and stability throughout the SADC region. He noted that no real social and economic progress can take place without long lasting peace and stability, and that conflicts in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda and Burundi have adverse effects on all the economies in the region. President Muluzi stated that he was encouraged by the strides that have been made in promoting good governance, transparency and the rule of law in the region. He pledged SADC's determination to perfect and consolidate democratic values and structures.

5. President Muluzi called attention to the challenges of HIV/AIDS and appealed to SADC countries to consolidate their efforts, and mobilise resources to combat the pandemic.

Best copy available

6. Summit welcomed the newly elected President of the Republic of Zambia, His Excellency Mr Levy P. Mwanawasa SC, and congratulated him on his victory. In his address to the Summit President Mwanawasa pledged Zambia's commitment to finding durable solutions to conflicts, through multilateral and other mechanisms such as the Tripartite Mechanism for Cooperation in Security between Angola, Namibia and Zambia. He further pledged that Zambia would use its position as Chair of the OAU to lobby the international community to support the DRC peace process, especially to ensure that the Inter-Congolese Dialogue commences as soon as possible.

7. In his vote of thanks, the President of the Republic of Angola, His Excellency Jose Eduardo Dos Santos observed that SADC countries shall only be able to overcome poverty, illness and illiteracy if the conflicts in the region are permanently resolved. He noted that the issue of terrorism is of major international concern, one from which the region has suffered, and against which SADC has taken a firm and unequivocal position. He applauded SADC for its united approach to the resolution of regional conflicts, and appealed for the strengthening of that unity.

8. The SADC Executive Secretary, Dr Prega Ramsamy noted that the Summit provides a unique opportunity to address the conflict situation in the SADC region, and underlined the need to move forward in unison. He noted that peace and security are pre-requisites for sustained growth and development. He further emphasised the need for the SADC region to halt its marginalisation in the global process.

9. The Summit received a statement from Ambassador Said Djinnit, Assistant Secretary General in charge of Political Affairs at the Organisation of African Unity. He commended SADC for its timely initiative in convening the Summit, and underlined the need to strengthen continental and regional mechanisms to deal with conflicts more effectively. He emphasised the importance of enhancing the cooperation between these mechanisms, based on the principles of complementarity and comparative advantage.

10. A presentation of the main findings of the World Health Organisation Commission on Macro-Economics and Health was made to the

Summit by its Chairperson, Prof Jeffrey Sachs, who underlined that health was a pre-requisite for economic development.

11. A message of goodwill to the Summit was received from the United Nations Secretary General Mr Kofi Annan.

12. Summit received a report from President Joseph Kabila on the peace process in the DRC. Summit welcomed the partial withdrawal of Ugandan forces, and urged the latter and Rwandan forces to complete their withdrawal as a matter of urgency. Summit expressed concern at the slow progress in the implementation of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, and urged all parties concerned to comply fully with its provisions. Consequently, Summit tasked the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security with the responsibility to formulate a strategy for speeding up implementation of the Agreement, in collaboration with the Joint Monitoring Committee.

13. Summit expressed its gratitude to International Cooperating Partners which have consistently supported the Lusaka Peace Agreement on the DRC, and urged them to continue this support until peace and security are attained.

14. Summit welcomed President Kabila's active involvement in the Inter Congolese Dialogue, which is aimed at reconciling the Congolese people and ushering in a new political dispensation.

15. Summit received a report on the progress of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from the Facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire. Summit noted the preparatory talks held in Gaborone in August 2001, at which the parties committed themselves to a number of procedures and substantive actions, most of which have been implemented. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue which commenced in Addis Ababa in October 2001 was abandoned due to procedural and financial constraints. The Dialogue will resume in South Africa in mid-February 2002.

16. The Facilitator expressed concern at the inadequate funding for the Dialogue, and appealed for additional financial support to ensure the success of the Inter Congolese Dialogue. In this regard, Summit mandated the SADC Chairperson, and the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security to work with the facilitator to mobilise the required resources.

17. Summit received a report from President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos on the situation in Angola, where relative peace now prevails as a result of the Government Peace Plan which is a combination of military, economic, political and social efforts. Summit noted that national territory had been liberated, and national boundaries re-established. The government has established full administration throughout the national territory and this has significantly contributed to an improvement in the movement of people, goods and services.

18. Summit called for the continuation and intensification of sanctions against UNITA-SAVIMBI in order to bring the rebel movement to dialogue and to compel it to comply with the provisions of the Lusaka Peace Protocol. Summit welcomed the Angolan Government's commitment to the 1994 Lusaka Peace Protocol, and urged UNITA-SAVIMBI to return to the negotiating table, in a spirit of national reconciliation.

19. Summit welcomed the following actions to be undertaken by Zimbabwe: full respect for human rights, including the right to freedom of opinion, association and peaceful assembly for all individuals; the commitment to investigate fully and impartially all cases of alleged political violence in 2001 and action to do so; a Zimbabwean Electoral Supervisory Commission which is adequately resourced and able to operate independently; the accreditation and registration of national independent monitors in good time for the elections; a timely invitation to, and accreditation of a wide range of international election observers; commitment to freedom of expression as guaranteed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe; reaffirmation by Zimbabwe of its practice of allowing national and international journalists to cover important national events, including elections, on the basis of its laws and regulations; commitment by the government of Zimbabwe to the independence of the judiciary and to the rule of law; and the transfer by the Government of Zimbabwe of occupiers of non designated farms to legally acquired land.

20. Summit welcomed the assurances by President Mugabe that the forthcoming Presidential Elections scheduled for 9-10 March 2002 will be free and fair. Summit noted the steps that have been taken by the Government of Zimbabwe to ensure the efficient and effective management of the elections. Summit noted with appreciation the

commitment of the Government of Zimbabwe to launch a peace campaign that would include the opposition and other stakeholders.

21. The Summit expressed serious concern on the statement made by the Zimbabwe army on the outcome of the election, and urged the Government of Zimbabwe to ensure that in accordance with the multi-party political dispensation prevalent in SADC, political statements are not made by the military, but by political leaders.

22. Summit noted with concern the negative reporting by certain sections of the media on Zimbabwe, and appealed to them to be objective. Summit expressed concern over the fact that some Western countries have authorised the broadcasting from their territories by their nationals of hostile and inciting propaganda against the Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe. Summit called upon those countries to desist from such actions.

23. Summit adopted a report by the Chairperson of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, His Excellency Joaquim Chissano President of the Republic of Mozambique. The report covers a review of the political situation in the region, terrorism, the Richard Ryan report on Sanctions Against UNITA-SAVIMBI, a Programme of Activities for the Organ, Support to the Secretariat to service the Organ, and Funding of the Organ.

24. Summit adopted a SADC Declaration Against Terrorism.

25. Summit expressed its gratitude to the Government and People of Malawi for their hospitality during the Extra Ordinary Summit.

Blantyre, Malawi
14 January 2002

United Nations A/56/827-S/2002/181

General Assembly
Security Council

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Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 18 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you that the so-called "Iraqi National Congress", based in London and Washington, issued a statement on 13 February 2002 in which it claimed responsibility for sabotage operations during the past seven months against Iraqi civilian facilities, including refineries, pumps and oil pipelines, and said that it had rockets and booby-trapped cars in these operations.

While the United States of America and the United Kingdom claim to be seeking to combat terrorism, they are continuing to apply the same old policy of sheltering, harbouring and arming terrorist groups that seek to undermine stability in numerous countries and permitting such groups to announce such terrorist operations through their offices opened in London and Washington and financed officially by the United Kingdom and the United States.

International law is an indivisible whole, and the principles governing terrorism are an indivisible whole. The United States-United Kingdom selective practices of proclaiming the combating of terrorism, on the one hand, and harbouring terrorists on the other, jeopardize the goal of combating terrorism, as well as constituting a breach of international peace and security, particularly since the United Kingdom chairs the Counter-Terrorism Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), which imposes on it the obligation to be in the forefront of the battle against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and not to provide a clear example of double standards with regard to terrorism.

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdul Munim **Al-Kadhe**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

02-25753 (E) 210202 210202

United Nations A/ES-10/148–S/2002/182

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
20 February 2002

Original: English

General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Identical letters dated 20 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

The toll of death and destruction in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, continues to rise with the incessant attacks by the Israeli occupying forces against the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian infrastructure. In recent days, the violence by Israeli forces against Palestinian targets has sharply intensified in a vicious cycle of reprisals and recriminations ordered by the Israeli government of Mr. Ariel Sharon. The Israeli attacks have been carried out by all means of heavy weaponry, including tank shelling, machine-gun fire, naval bombardments and missiles fired from helicopter gunships and F-16 warplanes.

Overnight, Israeli occupying forces bombarded and raided Gaza city from air, land and sea for more than five hours, terrorizing the Palestinian population and destroying a number of civilian and official buildings and attacked the official compounds of President Yasser Arafat in Gaza city and Ramallah where he remains under military siege. Israeli occupying forces also committed other attacks in Palestinian cities in the West Bank, including Nablus, Jenin and Ramallah.

All of the above-mentioned attacks by the Israeli forces resulted in the killing of Palestinian civilians, including at least two children, and the injury of dozens, some critically wounded. Further, these attacks have been carried out in civilian areas, including crowded refugee camps, gravely endangering the lives of many other Palestinian civilians. The assaults in Gaza caused the deaths of 5 Palestinian security officers, while the assaults in Nablus caused the deaths of 10 Palestinians, including 7 Palestinian policemen and 3 youths, and the attacks on Ramallah killed 2 Palestinians. These attacks follow Israeli assaults carried out over the past few days, which have caused the deaths of other Palestinian civilians, including three children, and widespread destruction throughout the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

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In addition to the killings, the Israeli forces have abducted more than 20 Palestinians in raids in the Occupied Territory. Moreover, tightening the closures and restrictions on movement, as of today the Israeli army has prohibited all Palestinian movement between Palestinian cities, towns and villages, confining the entire Palestinian population and preventing all types of socio-economic activities, virtually suffocating the Palestinian people.

In follow-up to my previous 97 letters to you regarding the grave deterioration of the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, dated from 29 September 2000 to 15 February 2002 (A/55/432-S/2000/921; A/55/437-S/2000/930; A/55/450-S/2000/957; A/55/466-S/2000/971; A/55/474-S/2000/984; A/55/490-S/2000/993; A/ES-10/39-S/2000/1015; A/ES-10/40-S/2000/1025; A/ES-10/42-S/2000/1068; A/ES-10/43-S/2000/1078; A/ES-10/44-S/2000/1093; A/ES-10/45-S/2000/1104; A/ES-10/46-S/2000/1107; A/ES-10/47-S/2000/1116; A/ES-10/48-S/2000/1129; A/ES-10/49-S/2000/1154; A/ES-10/50-S/2000/1173; A/ES-10/51-S/2000/1185; A/ES-10/52-S/2000/1206; A/ES-10/53-S/2000/1247; A/ES-10/54-S/2001/7; A/ES-10/55-S/2001/33; A/ES-10/56-S/2001/50; A/ES-10/57-S/2001/101; A/ES-10/58-S/2001/131; A/ES-10/59-S/2001/156; A/ES-10/60-S/2001/175; A/ES-10/61-S/2001/189; A/ES-10/64-S/2001/209; A/ES-10/65-S/2001/226; A/ES-10/66-S/2001/239; A/ES-10/67-S/2001/255; A/ES-10/68-S/2001/284; A/ES-10/69-S/2001/295; A/ES-10/70-S/2001/304; A/ES-10/71-S/2001/314; A/ES-10/72-S/2001/332; A/ES-10/75-S/2001/352; A/ES-10/76-S/2001/372; A/ES-10/79-S/2001/418; A/ES-10/80-S/2001/432; A/ES-10/81-S/2001/447; A/ES-10/82-S/2001/463; A/ES-10/83-S/2001/471; A/ES-10/84-S/2001/479; A/ES-10/85-S/2001/486; A/ES-10/86-S/2001/496; A/ES-10/87-S/2001/504; A/ES-10/88-S/2001/508; A/ES-10/89-S/2001/544; A/ES-10/90-S/2001/586; A/ES-10/91-S/2001/605; A/ES-10/92-S/2001/629; A/ES-10/93-S/2001/657; A/ES-10/94-S/2001/669; A/ES-10/95-S/2001/686; A/ES-10/96-S/2001/697; A/ES-10/97-S/2001/708; A/ES-10/98-S/2001/717; A/ES-10/99-S/2001/742; A/ES-10/100-S/2001/754; A/ES-10/101-S/2001/783; A/ES-10/102-S/2001/785; A/ES-10/103-S/2001/798; A/ES-10/104-S/2001/812; A/ES-10/105-S/2001/814; A/ES-10/107-S/2001/821; A/ES-10/108-S/2001/826; A/ES-10/111-S/2001/880; A/ES-10/112-S/2001/918; A/ES-10/114-S/2001/928; A/ES-10/115-S/2001/932; A/ES-10/116-S/2001/941; A/ES-10/117-S/2001/971; A/ES-10/118-S/2001/989; A/ES-10/119-S/2001/991; A/ES-10/121-S/2001/1007; A/ES-10/122-S/2001/1024; A/ES-10/123-S/2001/1036; A/ES-10/124-S/2001/1084; A/ES-10/125-S/2001/1092; A/ES-10/126-S/2001/1118; A/ES-10/128-S/2001/1149; A/ES-10/129-S/2001/1166; A/ES-10/133-S/2001/1239; A/ES-10/134-S/2001/126; A/ES-10/136-S/2002/18; A/ES-10/137-S/2002/39; A/ES-10/138-S/2002/48; A/ES-10/139-S/2002/58; A/ES-10/140-S/2002/89; A/ES-10/141-S/2002/95; A/ES-10/142-S/2002/102; A/ES-10/143-S/2002/121; A/ES-10/144-S/2002/142; A/ES-10/145-S/2002/146; A/ES-10/146-S/2002/165 and A/ES-10/147-S/2002/175), I regret to inform you that, since my last letter to you, the intensification of the bloody Israeli military campaign has indeed caused a dramatic increase in the number of deaths and serious injuries among the Palestinian people.

As the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem, continues to seriously deteriorate with increasing death and destruction being wrought by the Israeli occupying forces against the Palestinian people and the Palestinian Authority, it is incumbent upon the international community to address the crisis situation. The United Nations Security Council bears particular

responsibility in this regard and must uphold its duties for the maintenance of peace and security. We therefore call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider this grave situation and to take immediate action. Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable for all the human rights violations, war crimes and State terrorism it is committing against the Palestinian people.

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Marwan **Jilani**
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.

United Nations S/2002/183

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 February 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 20 February 2002 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), I have the honour to convey the attached report on the international security presence in Kosovo covering the period 1 to 31 December 2001.

I should be grateful if you would bring it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kofi A. **Annan**

02-25815 (E) 200202

Annex

Monthly report to the United Nations on KFOR operations of the Kosovo Force

1. Over the reporting period (1 to 31 December 2001) there were approximately 38,500 troops of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in theatre.

2. The overall situation in Kosovo during the month of December remained relatively stable despite some reports of inter-ethnic tension, predominantly in the Mitrovica area, and of criminally motivated attacks throughout the province.

Security

3. KFOR continued to monitor any signs of support for terrorism. On 14 December, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and KFOR search facilities in Dakovica and Pristina used by the non-governmental organization Global Relief Foundation (GRF), detained three persons, and seized computers, disks, audio- and videotapes, papers and cash. This operation was coordinated with a similar search of GRF facilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. Incidents reported involving inter-ethnic violence included: disputes between Kosovar Serbs and KFOR troops who were escorting Kosovar Albanians visiting their former homes in the Mitrovica area — one KFOR soldier was injured; injury to a KFOR soldier in northern Mitrovica, when a grenade was thrown by a crowd protesting a search of the homes of Serbian activists; the evacuation by KFOR of a Kosovar Serb officer of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) after being threatened by the "bridge watchers"; and different incidents in Vucitrn, Lipljan, and Mitrovica involving the stoning of Kosovar Serb buses by Kosovar Albanians.

5. Incidents which are believed to be related to criminal activities include: extensive damage to a café in Leposavic following a dispute between rival gangs of Kosovar Serbs; an explosive device attack on a Kosovar Albanian restaurant in Novi Koljlovica; a bomb attack on a shop in Prizren and a grenade attack on a petrol station near Klina, in which a total of four people were slightly injured; several incidents in central Kosovo involving firearms, in which a Kosovar Albanian died; the shooting of a former NLA commander; the murder of a Bosniac from Montenegro in Mitrovica in a drive-by shooting; and the discovery of the body of a suspected drug dealer in a car in Mitrovica.

Border/boundary security

6. KFOR continued its activities along the borders with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia[1] and with Albania to confiscate weapons, deter smuggling, detain persons illegally crossing the borders, and deter others attempting to enter the province.

7. During the reporting period, 189 weapons, 217 mines, and 12,891 rounds of ammunition were seized. Seventy-six people were detained and handed over to UNMIK police. The number of attempted illegal border crossings on the Albanian border increased over the reporting period. Although most were related to

[1] Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

smuggling, some involved Albanians seeking food and supplies when their villages were cut off by bad weather.

Southern Serbia

8. With regard to the Air Safety Zone (ASZ), KFOR and the Commander of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Joint Security Forces agreed Temporary Operation Procedures following the North Atlantic Council's decision in August 2001 to relax the width of the ASZ from 25 kilometres to 10 kilometres.

Cooperation and compliance by the parties

9. With regard to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), UNMIK and KFOR have rejected the latest version of the KPC Peace Establishment list delivered at the end of September 2001 because of the high number of discrepancies. Procedures have been agreed to create a new, valid Peace Establishment by the end of January 2002. Once the list has been confirmed by UNMIK, KFOR will register the KPC members and prepare new identity cards, on behalf of UNMIK.

10. Regarding the plan to reduce the KPC establishment, the first list of 375 names for transfer to a reserve force was submitted by General Ceku on 14 December: of these, 111 KPC members were considered unacceptable[2] and their names were removed from the list. The next steps to be taken will include a reduction in the KPC budget and a rationalization of the infrastructure. A comprehensive review of KPC weapons policy is nearing completion with the aim of reducing by Spring the number of weapons authorization cardholders. On 24 December, the following three policy documents dealing with the KPC were signed and released: COMKFOR Directive 035 (a general policy statement); a COMKFOR Training Directive; and a COMKFOR Directive to COMKPC.

11. During the period under review, four cases of non-compliance were reported, the most serious of which related to the suspension of the Press and Information Officer of Regional Tactical Group 4, who criticized UNMIK and KFOR following the arrest of the first Kosovar Albanian charged with war crimes. Eleven cases of non-compliance were closed, leaving 24 cases open, pending investigation, or implementation of recent Joint Security Forces directions, or awaiting presentation to the judicial system.

12. KFOR conducted a roll-call on 6 December 2001 at the six KPC locations to check on discrepancies and absenteeism. Absenteeism has increased to 10 per cent compared to 3.3 per cent reported six months earlier. The increase in absenteeism is being investigated by KFOR.

13. The total number of weapons destroyed under the weapons destruction programme remains at 10,132; the weapons destruction programme will resume in January 2002.

14. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia security forces remain in general compliance with the terms of the Military Technical Agreement.

[2] Reasons for non-acceptance: names unknown; members previously dismissed or removed.

Cooperation with international organizations

15. KFOR continues to provide daily assistance to international organizations and non-governmental organizations throughout Kosovo, on request, and to provide security assistance in support of UNMIK police operations.

Return of refugees and displaced persons

16. The number of refugees from the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia estimated to be remaining in Kosovo has gone down from 23,200 reported in November to 16,360.

Kosovo-wide elections

17. As previously reported, KFOR provided support to UNMIK and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe during the Kosovo-wide elections held on 17 November. So far, the Kosovo Assembly has not been able to elect a Provincial President.

Introduction of the euro

18. Procedures for the introduction of the euro to replace the Deutschmark, due to be withdrawn in early 2002, began to be implemented with KFOR support at the beginning of December. KFOR helped with security aspects and storage of the currency.

Outlook

19. The security situation in Kosovo continues to be stable. Although ethnic tension still exists, particularly in Mitrovica, the level of violence has decreased across the province. Progress has been made on many fronts, however, including in establishing the judiciary, improving the environment, introducing the euro, and establishing the KPC reserve, but the formation of a governing coalition following the election of the Kosovo Assembly remains uncertain, largely due to political rivalries and manoeuvring within the ethnic Albanian parties.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
20 February 2002
English
Original: Arabic and English

Letter dated 20 February 2002 from the Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for the month of February and on behalf of the States members of the League of Arab States, I request the convening of an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the extremely dangerous situation in the occupied Palestinian Territory including Jerusalem and take the necessary action in that regard.

(*Signed*) Abdalla Saleh **Al-Ashtal**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Yemen to the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

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United Nations A/56/828–S/2002/185

General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-sixth session
Agenda item 166
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

Letter dated 20 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the latest acts of Palestinian terrorism directed against Israel.

Yesterday evening, at approximately 8 p.m. (local time), several Palestinian gunmen attacked an Israel Defense Forces position near the village of Ein Arik. Gunmen burst into a room where several off-duty soldiers were resting and opened fire at close range. The terrorists approached the soldiers by way of an access road that Israel had made available to facilitate the free movement of workers. In total, six Israeli soldiers were killed and a seventh was moderately wounded and evacuated to a nearby hospital. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, of Palestinian Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat's own Fatah faction, claimed responsibility for the attack. The same group claimed responsibility for two attacks on Monday which killed four Israelis and which was referred to in my letter dated 19 February 2002.

In another incident yesterday, an alert Israeli bus driver foiled an attempted suicide attack near Mehola. A suspicious individual attempted to board a bus but was blocked by the driver. As the bus pulled away, the terrorist detonated explosives strapped to his body. No one was injured.

These incidents are the latest in the ongoing campaign of Palestinian terrorism that have been detailed in my letters dated 28 January 2002 (A/56/798-S/2002/126), 22 January 2002 (A/56/788-S/2002/104), 18 January 2002 (A/56/781-S/2002/86), 16 January 2002 (A/56/774-S/2002/73), 11 January 2002 (A/56/771-S/2002/47), 4 January 2002 (A/56/766-S/2002/25), 13 December 2001 (A/56/706-S/2001/1198), 4 December 2001 (A/56/678-S/2001/1150), 30 November 2001 (A/56/670-S/2001/1141), 27 November 2001 (A/56/663-S/2001/1121), 12 November 2001 (A/56/617-S/2001/1071), 5 November 2001 (A/56/604-S/2001/1048), 24 October 2001 (A/56/506-S/2001/1011), 19 October 2001 (A/56/492-S/2001/990), 17 October 2001 (A/56/483-S/2001/975), 8 October 2001 (A/56/450-S/2001/948), 5 October 2001 (A/56/444-S/2001/943), 3 October 2001 (A/56/438-S/2001/938), 24 September 2001 (A/56/406-S/2001/907), 20 September 2001 (A/56/386-S/2001/892), 17

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September 2001 (A/56/367-S/2001/875), 7 September 2001 (A/56/346-S/2001/858), 4 September 2001 (A/56/331-S/2001/840), 30 August 2001 (A/56/325-S/2001/834), 27 August 2001 (A/56/324-S/2001/825), 13 August 2001 (A/56/294-S/2001/787), 9 August 2001 (A/56/286-S/2001/780), 8 August 2001 (A/56/280-S/2001/775), 6 August 2001 (A/56/272-S/2001/768), 27 July 2001 (A/56/225-S/2001/743), 26 July 2001 (A/56/223-S/2001/737), 17 July 2001 (A/56/201-S/2001/706), 13 July 2001 (A/56/184-S/2001/696), 3 July 2001 (A/56/138-S/2001/662), 2 July 2001 (A/56/131-S/2001/656), 21 June 2001 (A/56/119-S/2001/619), 19 June 2001 (A/56/98-S/2001/611), 18 June 2001 (A/56/97-S/2001/604), 13 June 2001 (A/56/92-S/2001/585), 11 June 2001 (A/56/91-S/2001/580), 4 June 2001 (A/56/85-S/2001/555), 30 May 2001 (A/56/81-S/2001/540), 25 May 2001 (A/56/80-S/2001/524), 18 May 2001 (A/56/78-S/2001/506), 11 May 2001 (A/56/72-S/2001/473), 9 May 2001 (A/56/69-S/2001/459), 1 May 2001 (A/55/924-S/2001/435), 23 April 2001 (A/55/910-S/2001/396), 16 April 2001 (A/55/901-S/2001/364), 28 March 2001 (A/55/863-S/2001/291), 27 March 2001 (A/55/860-S/2001/280), 26 March 2001 (A/55/858-S/2001/278), 19 March 2001 (A/55/842-S/2001/244), 5 March 2001 (A/55/821-S/2001/193), 2 March 2001 (A/55/819-S/2001/187), 14 February 2001 (A/55/787-S/2001/137), 13 February 2001 (A/55/781-S/2001/132), 2 February 2001 (A/55/762-S/2001/103), 25 January 2001 (A/55/748-S/2001/81), 23 January 2001 (A/55/742-S/2001/71), 28 December 2000 (A/55/719-S/2000/1252), 22 November 2000 (A/55/641-S/2000/1114), 20 November 2000 (A/55/634-S/2000/1108) and 2 November 2000 (A/55/540-S/2000/1065).

The State of Israel holds the Palestinian leadership fully responsible for yesterday's terrorist attack, which was perpetrated by forces under the direct authority of Chairman Arafat. These same forces also proudly claimed responsibility for both of Monday's attacks as well as for scores of other acts of terrorism over the course of 17 months of Palestinian violence. Despite its many declarations and commitments, the Palestinian leadership continues to plot violence against Israel, supports and harbours terrorist organizations, and refuses to arrest known terrorists operating freely in its territory.

The Palestinian leadership has committed itself to completely and unconditionally renounce the use of violence and terrorism; it has accepted the Mitchell Report which calls, first and foremost, for a complete cessation of violence; earlier this month, Chairman Arafat, once again, condemned terrorist attacks and reiterated his commitment to put an end to such activities in an article published in *The New York Times*. And yet, terrorism continues to escalate as the Palestinian leadership fails to follow up its words with the requisite action. In such a situation, it is impossible to regard Palestinian declarations as anything other than platitudes uttered for the benefit of international audiences. Peace will not come to the Middle East so long as the Palestinian Authority tolerates the existence of terrorist organizations in its territory and continues to support acts of violence directed against Israel.

The Palestinian Authority must assume its responsibility, in line with its repeated commitments, to end the violence and return to the path of dialogue and negotiations. The international community must continue to exert full pressure on the Palestinian leadership to stand by its commitments and work towards a complete cessation of hostilities.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of this letter circulated as a document of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 166, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Aaron **Jacob**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

United Nations S/2002/186

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 February 2002

Original: English

Letter dated 21 February 2002 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to request that, in accordance with its previous practice, the Security Council invite the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations to participate in the meeting of the Council to be held today, Thursday, 21 February 2002, regarding the situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including Jerusalem.

(*Signed*) Marwan **Jilani**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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